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Where Are The Elections?
The 1986 elections in California re-
vealed some shocking statistics. Seven
statewide elections (U.S. senator, gov-
ernor, lieutenant governor, secretary of
state, controller, attorney general and
treasurer) included six incumbents
funning for reelection. The four state
board of equalization districts included
three incumbents running again. Of the
45 congressional districts, 42 incumbents
sought reelection. Out of 20 state senate
seats and 80 state assembly seats
potentially contested, 18 and 70 in-
cumbents, respectively, sought a return
to Sacramento. Hence, of 156 non-local
elected positions, 139 involved incum-
bents seeking reelection.
Every single one of these 139 incum-
bents seeking reelection succeeded. Not a
single one suffered a defeat. This security
prevailed notwithstanding the political
party of the incumbent or the economic
condition of the area involved. Even
more disturbing was the margin of
victory.
Except for the well-publicized race
between Cranston and Zschau and one
close Assembly race in District 68, the
closest margin of any incumbent any-
where in the state was 7%. The margin
available to the incumbent was typically
over two to one. No real contest at all.
In order to fully appreciate the extent
of current incumbent entrenchment we
present below a chart for each position,
indicating the incumbent's percentage
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It is easy to be impressed by the defeat
of three Supreme Court judges in what
was an unusual no confidence vote, and
in so doing to underestimate the extent
to which current office holders have
rigged the rules to prevent an effective
challenge. These Supreme Court justices
do not have gerrymandered districts or
campaign contribution advantages com-
parable to executive and legislative office
holders. Most important, a reading of
the numbers in the table above, position
by position, revealing both the number
of incumbents reelected and the breath-
taking margin of their victories, is
quite shocking.
The reality does not reflect a healthy
democracy. In fact, it is fair to conclude
that California does not have an elec-
toral two-party system. To be sure,
politicians in Sacramento and Washing-
ton are divided into separate political
parties and they function within their
legislative bodies in a moderately
competitive manner. However, the
checks and balances of a multiparty
system must extend to the electorate to
be meaningful. It does not help a great
deal to have two "clubs" in Sacramento
and Washington if their members are
insulated from electoral competition as
to the persons they purport to represent.
One would hope that these legislators,
secure in their incumbency, would spend
a great deal of time supervising the
regulatory system described in this publi-
cation and would not worry about cater-
ing to monied interests to raise money
for apparently meaningless campaigns.
However, such is not the case. Instead,
the current legislative preoccupation
with money is one of the causes of exist-
ing electoral monopolies.
The excessive incumbency advantage
is caused by three major factors: 1)
the gerrymandering of districts; 2) use of
incumbent advantage for electoral pur-
poses; and 3) campaign contribution
advantage. The first and last of these
factors are most in need of immediate
reform.
Common Cause and others have sug-
gested in past years the creation of an
independent commission to set bound-
aries for the various legislative districts.
It is clear the Legislature, controlled
by one or the other party, cannot be en-
trusted with this fundamental constitu-
tional task. An independent entity of
some type, preferably of judicial makeup,
must draw these boundaries. If democ-
racy is to work in California, or
anywhere, the boundaries for representa-
tion must be drawn around natural
communities. People must know who
their representative is. The elected
official must represent a geographic ter-
ritory with a natural center and with
sensible and understandable boundaries.
The current pattern of ink-spill districts
designed to maintain a Republican or
Democratic balance for incumbent re-
election must give way to districts based
on natural community identification. If
these natural factors are to be adjusted at
all, it should be in the direction of greater
competition between the parties, not less.
One would perhaps fear that greater
competition between the parties might
lead to greater campaign spending and
excessive campaign contribution influ-
ence. However, the situation is so bad at
present that it is unlikely that structuring
the districts for real elections could
hardly make matters worse. To be sure,
there is excessive influence by monied
interests in Sacramento. In fact, anyone
who has worked any length of time in the
capitol is concerned by the levpl of cor-
ruption. Our legislators are not all for
sale, but money buys access and access
buys influence and votes. The atmos-
phere in Sacramento is one of pervasive
and cynical corruptive influence.
In 1984, the average spending for the
state Assembly (general election only)
was $253,000. For the state Senate, it
was $543,000. The overwhelming major-
ity of this money (over 70%) comes from
contributions by interest groups with
business before the Legislature. Only
13% of all the state legislative campaign
money in 1984 was collected in amounts
of under $100. The average legislator
now receives from 55-66% of his/her
money from PACs. In 1984, approxi-
mately 47% of all campaign contribu-
tions were received in amounts of
$5,000-plus.
It is the incumbents who are receiving
this money. In 1976, legislative incum-
bents outraised challengers 2.6 to 1. By
1984 Assembly incumbents outraised
challengers 14 to I and Senate incum-
bents outraised challengers 63 to 1.
Challengers actually raised less money
in 1984 than they did in 1976. Unsur-
prisingly, incumbents won 98% of the
reelection races in 1984, and, as we have
already pointed out, 100% in 1986. And,
as the table above indicates, very few
of these races were even close. Most
involved 2 to 1 or greater margins.
These problems are exacerbated by
the increase in off-year fundraising. In
1985, a non-election year, legislative
incumbents raised over $17 million. As
of July 1, 1985 legislative incumbents
had over $12 million in cash on hand for
their upcoming elections. Most impor-
tant, almost all off-year money is raised
by incumbents; for example in 1983 the
figure was 99.7%. Further, candidates
are now "transferring" money between
each other, which has the effect of both
hiding the source of contribution for a
given candidate, and increasing the
influence of those candidates receiving
large monies from special interests. In
the 1982 general election, candidates
received 31% of all their money in
transfers and other partisan contri-
butions from political parties and
other candidates. These transfers may
come in amounts of over $100,000 and
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are usually made in the last weeks of
the campaign.
Common Cause has proposed a Cam-
paign Spending Limits Act to give
challengers a chance, and to somewhat
inhibit the corruptive influence of special
profit-stake interests in legislative poli-
cies. This Campaign Spending Limits
Act includes contribution limits, expen-
diture ceilings, and limited matching
funds from a tax check-off mechanism.
Below is the outline of the Campaign
Spending Limits Act of 1986 as pro-
posed by Common Cause. The group is
now drafting similar provisions for a
1988 citizens' proposition.
The Center for Public Interest Law
supports this Act and urges its adoption.
It is unlikely that the Legislature, con-
sisting obviously of incumbents, would
ever countenance a serious vote for such
a measure. However, the proposition
mechanism in California can be used for
good as well as mischief.
The Common Cause proposition now
being organized for presentation in the
1988 election will give Californians a
chance to take their government back
into their own hands, to create possibly
real contests for electoral office, and to
restore a measure of meaningful elec-
toral democracy to our state.
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OUTLINE OF CAMPAIGN SPENDING LIMITS ACT OF 1986
I. Expenditure Limitations
Primary General Total
ASSEMBLY $150,000 $225,000 $375,000
SENATE $250,000 $350,000 $600,000
II. Key Contribution Limitations (per election)
* Individuals $1,000
* Organizations $2,500
* PACs receiving all contributions in amounts $5,000
of $50 or less ("Small Contributor PACs")
* Transfers between politicians Prohibited
" Non-election year contributions Prohibited
" Limit on total contributions in a two-year $200,000
period by organizations
III. Limited Matching Funds From Tax Check-off
Threshold amount candidates must raise




Candidates cannot receive matching funds unless they face
substantial opposition
Contributions matched at following ratios:
* $250 or under 3:1
* $250 or under from in-district
sources (individuals only) 5:1
Maximum amount of matching funds per candidate:
Primary General Total
ASSEMBLY $75,000 $112,000 $187,500
SENATE $125,000 $175,000 $300,000
